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11. Introduction
When looking at the global distribution of syndicated loans, we observe that firms in countries
with high political risk receive relatively few loans, and that many of these loans are structured as
limited-recourse project finance. The low number of loans can be understood in the context of the
law and finance nexus, which states that there is a positive correlation between creditor rights and
financial intermediation (Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer, 2007). The prominence of project
finance can be explained by the use of private contracting that mitigates the risks arising from
poorly functioning institutions in the host country (Qian and Strahan, 2005). Although these
concepts may help to explain the use of project finance in general, several questions remain
unanswered, such as when is it optimal to grant a project finance loan? How does the degree of
recourse influence the incentives of lenders and borrowers to manage risks? When multilateral
development banks are part of the syndicate, what role do they play in mitigating risk,
particularly political risk?
In this study, we follow Esty (2004) and define "project finance" as the creation of a
legally independent project company that is financed with equity from one or more sponsoring
firms, and which has non- or limited recourse debt for the purpose of investing in a capital asset.
We investigate the relationship between syndicated lending and the management of political and
corporate risks. To answer the questions we pose above, we develop a double moral hazard
model and test its predictions by using a global sample of syndicated and project finance loans
made to borrowers in 139 countries between 1991 and 2005.
Our theoretical model analyzes the terms of a private loan contract in a set-up in which
the  borrower  must  exert  effort  in  order  to  manage  the  firm,  and  the  lender  is  able  to  mitigate
political risk. Generally, we show that there is a trade-off between the incentives for the borrower
and the lender when they determine the degree of recourse. We find that borrowers prefer project
2finance loans if the corporate governance system in a country is weak, economic health is poor,
and political risk and bank influence are high. In the empirical part of our study, we also test
which type of lender or syndicate is actually able to mitigate political risk in practice. Thus, our
study provides evidence for the way political risk can be mitigated through a loan contract, i.e.,
through the inclusion of multilateral or national development banks in the syndicate.
The gas field project that the South African petrochemical group Sasol is currently
developing in Mozambique illustrates how contracts can be designed to mitigate political risk. To
finance the deal, Sasol opted for a unique hybrid project finance structure. Initially, lenders have
full recourse to Sasol, which assumes almost all project related risks. The sole – but important –
exception is the project’s political risk. Here, the loan contract specifies that if well-defined
political risk events occur, the lenders have the right to switch from the full-recourse structure to
a project-financing structure. The lenders, in particular the development banks that fund more
than half of the loan, requested that this hybrid structure be created. Cadwalader (2004), the
project’s legal consultant, interprets this structure as a commitment device of the development
banks to actively mitigate the political risk: “Sasol would like to maximize the influence that the
political risk providers [… ] bring to the deal – their ability to exert political pressure on, in this
case, Mozambican government to prevent or cure a political risk event. Limiting the ability of the
lenders, and effectively of the subrogated insurers, to pull the proverbial rug from underneath the
project (by limiting the lenders’ acceleration and enforcement rights) is arguably the most
effective way of insuring that such institutions actively seek to remedy or mitigate any political
risk event [… ].”
We provide a systematic analysis of the relationship between political risk, its mitigation by
lenders, and the type of loan, e.g., the degree of recourse under the loan contract.  Thus, our study
relates to the empirical and theoretical literature on syndicated loans in general and on project
3finance loans in particular, and also to papers on the relationship between law and finance. Since
we study the incentive effects of different loan types for borrowers and lenders, our paper is also
related to the theoretical literature on bank moral hazard and double moral hazard.
Most empirical studies on project finance are limited to loan-pricing studies or syndicate-
structure analysis.1 Despite the fact that the focus of these studies is quite different from our own,
these studies provide clear evidence for the relevance of political risk. All loan-pricing studies
agree that political risk, either directly or indirectly via a political risk guarantee, is reflected in
the spread of the loan. Kleimeier and Megginson’s (2000) study also indicates that the higher the
political risk of the host country the more likely is project finance.
Esty and Megginson (2003) investigate the syndicate structure of project finance loans in
the context of legal quality,  which, though not identical  to political  risk,  is  clearly related to it.
These authors find that for borrowers in countries with weak creditor rights and poor legal
enforcement, syndicates must be particularly large and diffuse in order to deter strategic default.
In contrast, in countries with strong and enforceable legal rights, syndicates are structured to
ensure monitoring and low-cost recontracting. Thus, the syndicate structure is a direct response to
risk. Qian and Strahan (2005) present similar results. These authors argue that the design of
private loan contracts is determined by the legal and institutional characteristics of a country.
Among the few theoretical papers on project finance, none addresses the issue of political
risk in the context of borrower and lender incentives. Shah and Thakor (1987) and John and John
(1991) model project finance based on the tax advantage of debt, and Chemmanur and John
(1996) focus on private benefits of control. Habib and Johnson’s (1999) model is driven by the
redeployability of assets. Laux (2001) argues that project finance can be used as a commitment
devise by the headquarters to monitor the quality of the project and to influence the project
4manager’s incentives. Our study is thus the first that models project finance as an instrument to
optimally align both borrower and lender incentives.
Moral hazard papers study different types of bank moral hazard depending on the tasks
assigned to the bank. Rajan and Winton (1995) investigate the bank's incentive to gather
unverifiable information on the future prospects of the firm after credit is granted. Manove,
Padilla, and Pagano (2001) study the bank’s incentive to exert costly effort for screening projects
ex ante. More realistically, the bank’s as well as the firm’s efforts are unobservable, so there is a
double moral hazard problem. If the double moral hazard problem exists because the bank has to
monitor  the  effort  of  the  firm,  then  it  is  optimal  to  finance  firms  by  a  mix  of  bank  credit  and
external capital (Besanko and Kanatas (1993)). Double moral hazard also arises in venture capital
arrangements in which the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist must exert effort (Schmidt,
(2003)). Neither pure equity finance nor pure debt finance solves both problems simultaneously.
Instead, a convertible security with an appropriately set price gives both parties an incentive to
exert first best effort.
The empirical studies on project finance highlight the prominent role of political risk. Our
paper systematically analyzes how political risk is mitigated through private contracting that is
designed such as to solve the double moral hazard problem. Our study provides empirical support
for the notation that multilateral development banks act as “political umbrellas”.
Our study proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents our model with the double moral hazard
problem. We analyze the incentives that result from different degrees of recourse for both lenders
and borrowers. In section 3, we derive empirically testable hypotheses. We interpret the effort of
the lender as an effort made to influence political risk, and the effort of the borrower as an effort
made to increase the profitability of the project. We present the data sources in section 4. Section
1 Loan pricing studies include Sorge and Gadanecz (2004), Nguyen and Ross (2002), Kleimeier and Megginson
55 provides a description of the global use of project finance and discusses our empirical results.
Section 6 concludes.
2. A Double Moral Hazard Model of Project Finance
We discriminate different modes of bank finance, i.e., full-recourse syndicated loan versus
project-finance loans. A project-finance loan can either be a limited-recourse loan that allows
lenders some recourse to the sponsors, in the form of, for example, additional equity or the
reduction of dividend or royalty payments; or a non-recourse loan that gives lenders no recourse
to the sponsors.
2.1. The Basic Model
A firm wants to finance a project, which yields a payoff of X >0 in the case of success and zero
in the case of failure. We assume that the project’s assets have a liquidation value of zero. The
project costs I. We assume that the firm finances the investment project through credit. The
probability of the project’s success p is determined by the effort of the firm, denoted by e, and by
the effort of the bank, denoted by b. We assume that the impact on the probability of success is
independent of the action of the respective other agent, so we do not model the bank in its
traditional role as a monitor.
If the firm's manager exerts effort e, the probability of success increases from p  to p .
Similarly, if the bank decides to exert effort b, the probability of success increases from pL to pH.
Accordingly, the probabilities of success can be Hp , Lp , Hp  or Lp . The sponsoring firm that
decides on the realization and financing of a new project has wealth of W. This wealth includes
(1998, 2000, 2002), Ivashina (2005). Esty and Megginson (2003) and Sufi (2006) analyze the syndicate structure.
6all  assets of the firm and the cash flows generated by all  other projects of the firm. We assume
that assets are not firm specific.
The time line is as follows: The firm decides whether to incorporate the project within the
sponsoring firm or separately. At time 0, the bank offers a selection of credit contracts.  All
contracts specify the repayment R in the case of success and V in the case of failure, where V is
determined by the bank’s degree of recourse. The firm chooses the contract, which is then signed
by the bank and the firm. Next, both the firm and the bank can exert effort. At time 1, the payoff
of investment, i.e., X or zero, is realized and the bank receives repayment R in the case of success
or V in the case of failure.
The decision on how to incorporate the project determines the debtor’s liability and the
bank’s  degree  of  recourse,  and  therefore  the  bank’s  payoff  if  the  project  fails.  If  the  project  is
incorporated separately, unless the sponsor grants limited recourse it receives a non-recourse
credit. If the project is incorporated within the sponsoring firm, the bank grants a traditional full-
recourse credit. Table 1 shows that in the case of full recourse, the bank receives R even if the
project fails and generates a payoff of zero. However, in the case of limited or non-recourse
credit, the bank only receives V if the project fails with 0VX >>  in the limited-recourse case,
and V=0 in the non-recourse case.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
We restrict the analysis to welfare-increasing projects characterized by the assumption
0.b-e-I-Xb)p(e, ³ (1)
In a first-best world with symmetric information, the effort levels of both the firm and the bank
can be observed and verified by the court, and therefore stipulated in a contract. In practice, these
7effort levels are not contractible. Thus, the credit contract must be designed so that both parties
have  an  incentive  to  exert  effort.  However,  in  a  world  with  asymmetric  information,  the
incentives  of  both  bank  and  borrower  depend  on  the  terms  of  the  credit  contract.  With  a  non-
recourse loan, the firm has an incentive problem, because the expected net return for the firm’s
manager is lower than its effort costs:
( ) e.
p
IXpp <÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
-- (2)
Nevertheless, it is socially efficient to exert effort, because we assume that the increase in the
expected returns exceeds the costs of effort, i.e. ( ) eXpp >- .  Furthermore,  we  assume that  it  is
possible to solve the bank’s moral hazard problem if it grants a non-recourse loan, since the
highest expected return from exerting effort covers the bank’s effort costs:
( ) b
p
Ipp
H
LH >- . (3)
We solve the game by backward induction. We assume that the banking sector is perfectly
competitive; thus, banks make zero expected profit. Firms chose the contract that maximizes their
payoff  from  the  selection  of  contracts.  First,  we  must  study  which  type  of  contract  solves  the
bank’s moral hazard problem, then we must analyze which loan contract solves the firm’s moral
hazard problem. Only then can we focus on the double moral hazard case to show which type of
contract is optimal.
2.2. The Moral Hazard Problem of the Bank
The bank can increase the probability of success by exerting effort b. It decides to do so if
( ) ( )
( )( ) b.VRpp
or
Vp1RpbVp1Rp
LH
LLHH
³--
-+³--+
(4)
8The incentive compatibility constraint of the bank (IC-B) in (4) is more easily fulfilled if the
difference between the bank's payoffs in the case of either the success or failure of the project is
high. Consequently, increasing R and simultaneously decreasing V improves the bank's incentive
to exert costly effort. We restrict our analysis to parameters that fulfill the bank’s participation
constraint (PC-B), given by:
( ) 0bIVp1Rp HH ³---+ (5)
Proposition 1: The moral hazard problem of the bank can always be solved by granting a non-
recourse credit, i.e. V=0.
Proof: See Appendix A.
By incorporating the project separately, the firm is not liable at all if the project fails. Therefore,
the difference between the bank’s payoffs for either success or failure is high, and the bank has
an incentive to exert effort. If it is not possible to induce the bank to exert effort by separately
incorporating the project, then the moral hazard problem of the bank cannot be solved. We
exclude this possibility by assumption (3). Of course, if the moral hazard problem of the bank is
less severe, i.e., ( )( ) bVRpp LH ³-- , then both non-recourse and limited-recourse credits solve
the incentive problem.
2.3. The Moral Hazard Problem of the Firm
The firm's manager must also decide whether to exert effort e. Therefore, the management
considers the expected payoff that is influenced by the probability of success, the repayment R in
the case of success, and the repayment V in the case of failure. Effort is exerted if
9( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )( ) e.VRXpp
or
VWp1RXWpeVWp1RXWp
³+--
--+-+³---+-+
 (6)
By inspecting the incentive constraint of the firm (IC-F) of Eq. (6) in more detail, we obtain the
following implication for its liability.
Proposition 2: The moral hazard problem of the firm can always be solved by making the
borrower fully liable, i.e., R=V.
Proof: See Appendix A.
By increasing the debtor's liability, his payoff in the case of failure is reduced, and the difference
in state-contingent payoffs of the firm increases. Thus, the credit contract provides an incentive to
the firm to exert effort. If the moral hazard problem of the firm is less severe,
i.e., ( )( ) eVRXpp ³+-- , then the first-best solution can be reached with limited or full-
recourse credit.
2.4. Double Moral Hazard
The empirical facts suggest that both banks and firms have to contribute to the success of an
investment project. Propositions 1 and 2 show that the debtor's liability influences both the bank's
and the firm's incentive to exert costly effort. On the one hand, limited recourse increases the
bank's incentive. On the other hand, limited recourse has a negative impact on the firm's
incentive.
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Proposition 3: If both incentive problems are less severe, i.e., b
pp
1e
pp
1X
LHHH -
+
-
³ ,
( )( ) bVRpp LH ³-- and ( )( ) eVRXpp ³+-- , limited recourse, i.e., R>V>0, solves the double
moral hazard problem.
Proof: See Appendix A.
If the incentive problems are not severe, the bank can design a credit contract that solves both
incentive problems. The exact terms of the credit contract depend on how slack the incentive
compatibility constraints are. Since we assume that banking is perfectly competitive, the contract
always generates an expected profit of zero to the bank, i.e.,
( ) 0bIVp1Rp HH =---+ . (7)
Therefore, the relationship between R and V is deduced as
( )
p
Vp1bIR
H
H--+= . (8)
If the bank’s incentive compatibility constraint but not the firm’s incentive compatibility
constraint is binding, the credit contract stipulates
þ
ý
ü
î
í
ì
-
-=
-
-
+=
LH
L
LH
L
pp
pbIV;
pp
p1bIR . (9)
Both the bank and the firm have an incentive to exert effort only if the condition stated in
proposition 3 holds. For all other parameter constellations it is impossible to design a contract
that solves both moral hazard problems. In such cases, the contract should grant an incentive to
the party for whom the moral hazard problem is solved most efficiently. In the following
proposition we state which of the moral hazard problems should be solved.
11
Proposition 4: If it is not possible to solve both incentive problems, i.e.,
b
pp
1e
pp
1X
LHHH -
+
-
< (10)
and the moral hazard problem of the firm is severe, i.e.,
( ) ( ) eXppbXpp LLLH -->-- , (11)
then it is optimal to solve the incentive problem of the bank through project finance by separately
incorporating the new project and via granting a non-recourse credit, i.e., V=0.
Proof: See Appendix A.
For most parameter constellations, it is not possible to design a contract that gives both parties
appropriate incentives. Therefore, the optimal contract solves the incentive problem of the party
whose effort has a relatively higher impact on the probability of success. Therefore, it is optimal
to solve the bank’s incentive problem if ( ) ( ) eXppbXpp LLLH -->-- . For example, if e and
b have the same size and b increases the probability of success more than e, then it is optimal to
give the bank the incentive to exert effort.
To induce the bank to exert effort, the difference between the payoffs for success and
failure must be high. The credit contract can stipulate a sufficiently high difference between the
state-contingent payoffs when the new investment project is separately incorporated. Then, the
bank  receives  no  return  in  the  case  of  failure,  as  the  project’s  payoff  is  zero  and  there  is  no
recourse on the assets of the firm that sponsors the project.
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3. Testable Hypothesis
Our model defines the effort of both the bank and the firm only generally, and thus leaves room
for different types of effort. Since the focus of our study is on risk management, we apply the
propositions that arise from our theoretical model to the firm’s and bank’s effort in managing
risks. As noted earlier, our only assumption on the efforts of bank and firm is that the influence of
one on the probability of success of the project is independent of the actions of the other. In our
model we assume that the bank exerts effort to mitigate political risk, and that the manager makes
an effort to improve the firm’s operational performance. For example, the manager determines
the technical realization of the project. The bank, which has many ways in which it can influence
the probability of the project's success, might, for example, try to influence government
decisions, or it might assist the firm in obtaining access to markets or experts like an auditor.
We  base  our  empirical  analysis  on  Proposition  4,  because  we  perceive  that  in  reality  the
incentive problems are severe. We use the notation of our model to phrase the incentive problems
we intend to study. The bank’s moral hazard problem arises because a bank must exert effort,
which causes costs of b in order for the bank to reduce political risk, which is captured by
)p(p LH - . The firm’s moral hazard problem arises because a firm must exert effort, which
causes costs of e, in order for the firm to increase the probability of success from p  to p . For a
more detailed derivation, we note that Proposition 4 predicts that project finance should be the
preferred financing choice when
1
e)Xpp(
b)Xp(p
e)Xpp(b)Xpp(
LL
LH
LLLH >
--
--
Û-->-- . (12)
An economic interpretation of this project finance preference ratio (PFP ratio) relates the use of
project finance to four factors. These factors capture the firm’s and the bank’ incentive problems
in the following way:
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 The  firm’s  moral  hazard  problem  is  reflected  by  the  denominator  of  the  PFP  ratio,  and
here by the influence of managerial effort on the probability of success, given by ( )LL pp - , in
relation to the manager’s effort costs e. We believe that in countries with a healthy economy, a
given level of effort changes the success probability more than would the same effort in a country
with a weak economy. In other words, the higher is ( )LL pp - , the better the economic health and
performance of a country. As the PFP ratio decreases with an increase in ( )LL pp - , we should
observe  a  negative  relation  between  economic  health  of  the  borrower’s  country  and  the  use  of
project finance.
Furthermore, the effort a firm’s manager must exert to manage a corporation causes costs
of e. In an international comparison, we would expect the costs of effort to be higher in countries
with less effective corporate governance systems. (We note that the absolute size of effort costs
can be interpreted as private benefits. In countries with poor corporate governance, effort costs
are high and so are private benefits.) In these economies, there are far fewer restrictions and
punishments if a manager deviates from the best corporate strategy. Ceteris paribus, the firm’s
moral hazard problem is greater in countries with a poor corporate governance system. Given that
a  better  corporate  governance  system implies  lower  effort  costs  e,  and  given  that  the  PFP ratio
decreases with a decrease in e, we expect a negative relation between the quality of the corporate
governance system and the use of project finance.
The numerator of the PFP ratio reflects the bank’s moral hazard problem. Here, (pH-pL)
reflects the change in the probability of success when the bank exerts effort, and b reflects the
cost associated with this effort. We interpret (pH-pL) in the context of political risk. The more the
government’s actions can influence the probability of the success of a project, the higher the
difference between pH and pL will be. On the one hand, the probability of success of the project
14
without any effort by the bank, pL, will be low in countries with high government involvement
and high political risk. On the other hand, once the bank exerts effort, the success probability of
the project will be significantly increased. Thus, high political risk increases the numerator, and
we expect a positive relation between political risk and the use of project finance.
The bank’s influence on the host government is reflected in b. The higher the bank’s
influence on the host government, the lower is the cost of b at which a given increase in the
project’s success probability will be achieved. In other words, the lower the b, the cheaper it is
for  a  bank  to  constrain  politically  adverse  moves.  Therefore,  we  expect  a  positive  relation
between bank influence (measured by a smaller b) and the use of project finance.
To illustrate the role of banks of our model, consider the following situation: If the
government perceives that apart from the investment project under consideration, a bank is
important to the country, it might be more reluctant to engage in actions against the project
compared to a situation in which the government does not fear far-ranging consequences of its
actions. The government could, for example, be concerned that negative actions on one project
could spill over onto other projects financed by the same bank. From the bank’s point of view,
any effort will be less costly if the bank is relatively important to the government and country.
Among all lenders, multilateral development banks such as the International Financial
Corporation (IFC), a member of the World Bank Group, or the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) have high bargaining power because they finance
many projects and also provide financial aid. Thus, there is repeated interaction between the
development bank and the host government.
In contrast to commercial banks that might also be frequent lenders, the development banks
(DBs) have a special status. Buiter and Fries (2002) argue that multilateral development banks
differ from other lenders because their “(… ) support for private sector projects can be
15
instrumental in mitigating risks associated with government polities and practices”. Therefore,
multilateral DBs are also known as political umbrellas (see Buljevich and Park, 1999). For these
reasons, we expect that the bank’s ability to exert effort and consequently its effort cost b will
depend on its status as a DB as well as on its market share in the syndicated loan market.
Considering all these factors, we propose the following testable hypothesis:
Testable Hypothesis: Among all syndicated loans made to borrowers in a country, the fraction
of project finance loans is larger, the weaker the corporate governance system, the weaker the
economic  health,  the  higher  the  political  risk  of  the  borrower’s  country  and  the  higher  the
influence of the lending bank over the host government.
4. Data
Our main data source is the Dealscan database. To obtain a proxy for our dependent variable, we
extract from Dealscan all syndicated loans (SLs) signed between January 1, 1991 and December
31, 2005. By controlling for the borrower’s nationality and the type of syndicated loan, we can
define the project finance share as
100*
SL
PFLPFL_vol $
i
$
i
i = (13)
where PFL$i is the total volume of project finance loans (PFLs) in $ million of all borrowers of
country i and SL$i is the total volume of SL in $ million of all borrowers of country i.
First, we note that this measure of our dependent variable is consistent with our
assumption that the investment project is credit financed, and with our differentiation between
different types of bank finance. SL$i reflects all investments that managers finance with bank
credit. These include full-recourse syndicated loans as well as limited- or non-recourse PFLs.
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Using these factors makes it possible for our empirical analysis to explain how large the share of
PFLs is.
Second, we aggregate all loans to borrowers of the same country over time. Because not
all countries access the syndicated loan market every year, the number of panel-observations
ranges from one to 15 per country. Furthermore, for many of the panel observations, the value of
the dependent variable is zero. This is often the case for countries with a low number of SLs per
year. We opt for the pooled approach, because we have a sufficiently large number of countries
in our sample. However, we do conduct robustness checks based on a panel data set for those
countries that enter the syndicated loan market every year.
We obtain the proxies for our four explanatory factors from Dealscan, Euromoney, and
the World Bank. Since the firm’s moral hazard problem depends on how much an increase in the
manager’s effort will raise the success probability of a project, given the manager’s effort cost,
we need two country-level variables to measure these two components of firm moral hazard.
Earlier, we noted that a manager's influence on the probability of success depends on the
economic  health  of  a  country,  meaning  that  a  given  effort  has  a  larger  effect  in  a  country  with
better economic perspectives. We use Euromoney’s economic performance index as our proxy
for the economic health of the borrower’s country. This annual index is based on the current GDP
per capita figures and on a poll of economic projections. Thus, it contains not only current but
also forward-looking information, which is especially useful to us when we consider the medium
to long-term nature of syndicated loans. To aggregate this variable over time, we use an equally
weighted average over all years. Furthermore, we convert the original scale of this proxy from
zero to 25 to zero to 100. A higher value indicates better economic performance and health.
We  also  noted  earlier  that  the  firm’s  effort  costs  depend  on  the  country’s  corporate
governance system, which means that the weaker the corporate governance system, the higher is
17
the manager’s opportunity cost (lost private benefits or perquisites) of pursuing the best corporate
strategy. As a proxy for the strength of the corporate governance system, we use a measure of
financial  development  that  combines  the  development  of  the  stock  market  and  the  banking
system.  We  define  corporate  governance  as  the  equally  weighted  average  of  stock  market
capitalization and domestic credit to the private sector, both as a percentage of GDP. We obtain
both values from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). A higher value
indicates better corporate governance, because managers in countries with a more developed
financial sector are more controlled by active stockholders and bank lenders than are managers in
countries with less developed financial sectors. Thus, this measure captures the strength of the
corporate governance system in terms of market forces. Similar to our economic health proxy, we
average the annual values. Because we measure both components of the corporate governance
proxy as percentages, we do not rescale this variable.
The bank’s moral hazard problem also consists of two components, political risk and bank
influence, for which we need country-level proxies. We note that political risk can be divided into
three broad categories: traditional political risk, regulatory risk, and quasi-commercial risk (Smith
1997). The traditional political risk category addresses risks relating to expropriation, currency
convertibility, and transferability, and to political violence. The regulatory risk category covers
risks arising from unanticipated regulatory changes. These risks include taxation or foreign
investment laws applicable to the whole economy, but can also be industry specific. The quasi-
commercial risk category reflects those risks that arise when the project contends with state-
owned suppliers or customers whose ability or willingness to fulfill their contractual obligations
towards the project is questionable.
We consider traditional political risk and regulatory risk when we interpret bank moral
hazard. The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Research Indicators Data Set specifies six
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measures of political risk that fit our perception of these risk categories. These measures are the
voice and accountability of the government, political stability, government effectiveness,
regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. This data set covers all countries in our
sample, but its time coverage is limited to 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004. As our main proxy,
we use a combined average of all six measures. We apply simple averages and rescale the
resulting proxy from zero to 100. A higher value indicates more political risk. For a more detailed
analysis, we also look at each of these six measures separately.
As the second component of the bank’s moral hazard problem we measure the lender’s
influence over the host government, which, as noted earlier, depends on both the lender’s status
as a DB and its market share in the SL market. First, we obtain national league tables for SLs
signed between 1991 and 2005 for each country i from Dealscan. These tables rank all lenders
based on the amount of funds they provide during our sample period, which allows us to identify
exactly which lender provides how many funds to each country. Second, we classify lenders as
DBs based on the World Bank’s definition of multilateral development banks and multilateral
financial institutions. We define our measure of bank influence as the aggregate market share of
these DBs in the SL market and as such combine lender status and market share in our proxy. We
measure the market share of DBs as their total syndicated loan volume to borrowers of country i
relative to the total syndicated loan volume of all lenders to borrowers of country i. A higher
value indicates more bank influence.
For a detailed analysis, we also measure a lender’s individual market share and extend our
analysis to prominent national DBs, such as export-import banks. We include these latter lenders
if they have a substantial share in the SL market and might therefore have substantial influence
over the host government. Based on Dealscan’s league table for global SLs signed between 1991
and 2005, we select those national DBs that fund at least 100 SLs which are worth $1,000 bn.
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Table 2 lists the individual DBs and indicates to which category they belong.2 Among
them, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and Germany’s
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) are the most prominent lenders, followed by the Japan
Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC). There is no clear link between a DB’s total loan
volume and the share of PF in its loan portfolio. For example, the PFL-share is high for the first-
ranked EBRD but low for the second-ranked KfW. Overall, loan volume alone does not imply a
preference for project finance.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
5. The Global Market for Syndicated Loans, Project Finance, and Political Risk
5.1. The Use of Project Finance
Between January 1991 and December 2005, companies from 139 countries raised funds in the
global syndicated loan market, amounting to 119,779 facilities worth $24,778 billion.3 As Table 3
shows, 5,282 of these facilities are PFLs worth $941 billion, which lenders allocated to borrowers
from 108 countries. As expected, borrowers in industrialized countries receive most SLs. Western
Europe, North America, and Australia alone account for 87% of the global SL volume. Looking
at a country’s PFL borrowing relative to its total SL borrowing indicates that PFLs are not a very
important source of funds for corporate borrowers in industrialized countries. For example, in
North America and Western Europe, 3% or less of the total SL volume is in form of PFL.
2 The table also identifies which lenders we include in our bank influence proxy. When discussing empirical results
related  to  this  bank influence  proxy,  we will  refer  to  these  lenders  in  general  terms as  development  banks  (DBs).
Only when we conduct the detailed analysis of individual lenders will we specifically refer to the different lender
categories.
3 Dealscan actually contains loans to borrowers from 145 countries, but we deleted six countries (Bermuda, British
Virgin Islands, Brunei, Cayman Islands, Iraq, and Taiwan) due to missing values for our four main proxies. These
countries account for an additional 2,395 SL facilities worth $320,566 million.
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Australia is an exception with 15%, as are individual western European countries such as Greece
and Portugal. Borrowers from Latin America, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia
display a reverse pattern. For most of these countries, the volume of PFLs relative to all national
SLs  is  at  least  three  times,  and  at  most  ten  times,  as  high  as  the  global  average.  In  the  most
extreme cases of Cameroon, Nepal, and Uganda, PFLs account for 100% of the national SL
volume, followed by Liberia, Tajikistan, and Bosnia Herzegovina with more than 80%.
Overall,  it  appears  that  countries  with  high  shares  of  PFLs  represent  corporate  borrowers
from countries with higher political risk, lower economic performance, and less access to credit
or equity finance. This observation gives us our first indication that risk influences the decision of
banks and borrowers on PF over on-balance-sheet lending.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Fig. 1 and Table 4 provide further support for the overall relevance of risk for PF. Here we
use a very general, comprehensive measure of risk, Euromoney’s country risk score, which
comprises both economic and political risk. Fig. 1 presents our individual country observations
and shows a clear pattern of more project finance when there is higher country risk. In Table 4,
we split our total sample into quartiles based on this country risk score and compare the different
levels of SL and PFL usage. These quartiles confirm the results of Fig. 1. As risk increases from
low to  moderately  low,  the  relative  use  of  PFL rises  from about  7.1% to  22.5%.  For  countries
with moderately high and high political risk, PF becomes even more important as a source of
financing, amounting to 32.2% and 24.8%, respectively. To illustrate the strength of our results,
we note that for two of the four quartiles, the mean values for two consecutive quartiles are
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significantly different based on a one-sided z-test. The difference is most pronounced for the two
low country-risk quartiles and could imply a somewhat nonlinear relation between the use of PF
and risk.
[Insert Fig. 1 and Table 4 about here]
5.2. The Relevance of Bank and Firm Moral Hazard
To test our hypothesis, we first use our four main proxies for bank and firm moral hazard.
Regressions  (1)  to  (5)  in  Panel  A  of  Table  5  present  the  results.  Based  on  our  hypothesis,  we
expect to find that PF is used more often when the bank influence is stronger and political risk
and the economic health and corporate governance system are weaker. In the single regressions
(1) to (4), all slope coefficients are significant and have the expected signs. The coefficients’ size
shows that a 10% increase in bank influence, i.e., market share of DBs, leads to 4.8% more PF,
and a 10% increase in political risk leads to 6.8% more PF. The coefficients of our firm moral-
hazard proxies are somewhat smaller. Here, a 10% improvement in economic health or corporate
governance leads to 3.2% and 1.9% less PF, respectively. Combined with the explanatory power
in terms of adjusted R2, it appears that bank moral hazard, and particularly political risk, is the
most important determinant of the use of PF.
In the multiple regression (5), where we use factor analysis to remove the correlation
between the independent variables, each of our four proxies still has the expected sign. However,
our economic performance proxy is no longer significant. Based on our observations in Fig. 1 and
Table 4, we also consider nonlinear specifications (not reported) by using the squared values of
our independent variables. Although the coefficients have the expected sign, the explanatory
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power of these nonlinear regression are generally lower. Only for economic performance does the
adjusted R2 increase to 7.8% in comparison to the 6% of regression (3). However, in a multiple
regression, economic performance remains nonsignificant. Overall, our findings support both our
hypothesis and our theoretical model. We can also conclude that bank moral hazard is a relatively
more important determinant of PF.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
We conduct additional analyses to test whether our main results are robust for different
definitions of the dependent and independent variables. Table 5 also reports these results. In
Panels A to E, we aggregate the independent variables political risk, corporate governance, and
economic performance in different ways. In addition to the simple average, we either calculate a
weighted  average  with  weights  based  on  the  annual  SL  volume  or  we  use  the  first  or  last
available annual value. We also use the initial value of these variables in combination with the
absolute change in this variable between the initial and last year. Within each panel, the
dependent variable remains defined as project finance share based on the volume of PFLs but we
also use an alternative dependent variable based on the number of PFLs.
Looking at each panel separately, we see that our model is robust to the two different
definitions of our dependent variable. The sign, size, and general significance of our four
explanatory factors are roughly the same. However, we note that our model can explain the
variation in the number of PFLs better than it can explain the variation in terms of loan volume.
The adjusted R2s of the regressions are generally higher for the project finance share based on
loan numbers. Under the multiple regression specification in Panel B, where we use weighted
averages as an aggregation mechanism, we can explain almost 23% of the variation in the use of
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PFLs. This better fit for loan numbers might be driven by industry effects. For example, PFLs for
construction, oil and gas, or transportation projects are among the largest, with an average deal
size of more than $500 million, compared to loans for utilities, telecommunication, or mining
projects, with an average size of $395, $384, or $216 million, respectively. Since we aggregate
our data, we cannot control for these industry-driven demand effects. A dependent variable based
on loan numbers does not suffer from this bias and the fit of our model is better.
The results for the different aggregation mechanism appear to be robust. We find little
difference in terms of slope coefficient and explanatory power between simple averages, initial
values, or last values. However, the aggregation of weighted averages leads to higher explanatory
power, particularly in the multiple regressions. A weighted average is better able to capture the
response of PF to the time variations in political risk and corporate governance. In contrast, these
time variations  cannot  be  captured  with  our  specifications  in  Panel  E.  Here,  the  initial  level  of
each determinant matters, but the change over the years does not.
We also investigate whether the results are robust over time. Two important events took
place during our sample period, each of which affected global financial markets. These events
were the Asian crisis of 1997 and the Russian crisis of 1998. Therefore, we split our sample into
pre-crises, crises, and post-crises periods and aggregate the dependent and independent variables
separately for each of the three periods. Our results are reported in Table 6 and indicate that the
crises affect only the relation between firm moral hazard and PF. The role of DBs appears to have
become more important during the crises, but the differences are not statistically significant.
However, the sensitivity of PF to political risk increases significantly. Before the crises, we find
that a 10% increase in political risk leads to a 3.9% higher volume of PFL relative to SL. In
contrast, during and after the crises, the same 10% increase in political risk leads to a 4.1% and
5.5% higher volume of PFL relative to SL, respectively. This increased sensitivity might indicate
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that due to their experiences during the crises, lenders’ perceived level of political risk has
increased. Perhaps the crises changed their assessment of the benefits of PF. For example, before
the crises, lenders expected to be able to manage problems arising from a (severe) deterioration in
the  political  risk  environment  without  resorting  to  PF.  During  the  crises,  they  realized  that  this
was not the case. As a consequence, they now opt for PFLs in situations in which they used to
choose SLs.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
We also conduct an analysis on a country- and year-specific basis. Doing so allows us to
directly control for any crisis-driven time variations on an annual level. Furthermore, we can
recover any variation over the years that might be lost when we aggregate our dependent and
independent variables.
We construct a panel that contains all 65 countries that access the syndicated loan market
during each year between 1996 and 2004. The time restriction is necessary because our corporate
governance proxy has missing values for the other years. The reduction from 139 to 65 countries
allows us to create a balanced panel in which each cross-sectional country observation has the
same number of time-series observations. Table 7 presents the results, which confirm our
previous findings that bank influence, political risk, and corporate governance are the driving
forces behind the use of PF. As the fixed time-effects show, PF was indeed used more during the
crisis years. However, overall, the additional information included in the panel does not improve
the explanatory power of our model. Thus, we are confident that the pooled data set applied for
our main analyses is adequate.
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[Insert Table 7 about here]
5.3. In-Depth Analysis of Bank Moral Hazard
We wish to examine in more detail the relation between PF and bank influence, and PF and
political risk. First, for bank influence we provide a proxy by measuring the aggregate market
shares of all DBs including national ones. Comparing the results of regression (1) in Panel A of
Table 8 with our baseline result in regression (1) of Panel A of Table 5 shows that national DBs
do indeed have influence. Adding their market shares to our determinant increases the
explanatory power of our model from 8.2% to 15.4%.
In regression (2) of Table 8 we look at the market share of each DB category separately.
The significant coefficients for multilateral DBs and national DBs indicate that both groups can
influence political risk via PF, but because of their higher coefficients, national DBs are better
able to do so than are multilateral DBs. Multilateral financial institutions have a nonsignificant
coefficient, which indicates that even as a group, multilateral financial institutions can only
influence political risk when they join forces with other DBs.
Regression (3) investigates the role of the five leading DBs in terms of individual lending
share. Here, we find that individually, only the World Bank can significantly improve the
influence of the syndicate. A syndicate can influence political risk in such a way that the use of
PF increases by 3.2% for every 10% increase in lending share, but the impact of a syndicate that
includes the World Bank is twice as high as the coefficient of 6.8% (=3.2%+3.6%) shows.
[Insert Table 8 about here]
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Panel B of Table 8 reports the results of our in-depth analysis of political risk by looking at
the individual components of our political risk index. The positive, significant coefficients for
each of the six components are consistent with our earlier findings: under high political risk, the
borrower prefers PF. The fact that the regression results are similar implies that all forms of
political risk matter.
So far, our analysis indicates that political risk can be managed with PF. Other studies show
that private contracts help to mitigate the deficiencies of the legal system (Esty and Megginson,
2003; Qian and Strahan, 2005). Therefore, we wish to disentangle the effects that a poor legal
system has on the use of PF, as measured by the “rule of law” and “regulatory quality” indicators
on the one hand and political risk on the other. To do so, we conduct a two-step procedure. In the
first step, we run the regression (political risk = a + b rule of law). In the second step, we use the
resulting error term as the residual political risk. We proceed similarly for regulatory quality.
Our results, which we report in regressions (10) and (11), indicate that neither rule of law
nor regulatory quality can explain the whole variation in the use of PF. The influence of the
residual political risk is significant as well, if only marginally so in case of rule of law. Together
with the finding that our dependent variable varies systematically with bank influence, we
interpret this result as evidence that the borrower uses PF to give lenders an incentive to mitigate
political risk. Thus, the choice of a particular contract is motivated by both the aim to cure
institutional deficiencies and by the intention to mitigate political risk.
6. Conclusion
We open our paper with the surprising finding that banks grant relatively more PFLs to borrowers
in riskier countries. This observation indicates that limited recourse is an efficient choice that is
made by the parties of the credit contract, the bank, and the firm. We explain that limited
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recourse provides a bank with the incentive to exert effort in order to reduce political risk. Thus,
our model shows that the terms of a loan contract depend on the risk characteristics of the project
to be financed. Thus, the terms of the credit contract are used to manage risks.
From the empirical part of our study we conclude that project finance provides very flexible
structures that can be adapted to the needs of an individual project, particularly to the economic
and political environment in which the project operates. Moreover, we find evidence for the role
of multilateral and national DBs as political umbrellas. For commercial lenders, but also for
sponsors,  this  result  implies  that  they  can  use  the  participation  of  DBs  strategically  to  reduce
political risks. For lenders in general, political risk matters in terms of legal-system quality as
well as other political risks, and PF is an effective tool to deal with high risk environments. This
insight  has  important  implications  for  the  riskiness  of  PFLs  and  the  treatment  of  PFLs  by
regulators. Unless the contracting parties make other provisions, then having no recourse can
increase the loss given default. But the degree of recourse also has important incentive effects
that  influence  the  probability  of  default.  Studying  the  role  of  collateral  demonstrates  that  for
borrower behavior, the incentive effect dominates (Liberti and Mian, 2005). A similar argument
might apply to the impact of recourse on lender behavior. So far, there is very little information
about  the  probability  of  default  of  PFLs  compared  to  other  SLs.  The  empirical  test  of  this
question is left for future research.
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Appendix A: Proofs of Propositions 1 - 4
A.1. Proof of Proposition 1
Depending on the parameter constellation, we can distinguish two cases:
· Case A
( )( ) 0VforbVRpp LH ³³--
· Case B
( ) 0VforbRpp LH =³-
In Case A, non-recourse as well as limited-recourse credits solve the incentive problem. In
contrast to Case B, non-recourse is not a prerequisite for solving the bank’s moral-hazard
problem. In Case B, the bank needs higher-powered incentives, since the benefits of effort on the
probability of success are not as easily reaped, either because effort b is more expensive or not as
powerful in terms of increasing the probability of success, i.e., (pH - pL).
To induce the bank to exert effort, the project must be incorporated separately, and therefore the
firm is not liable at all in the case of failure. If it is not possible to induce the bank to exert effort
by separately incorporating the project, then the moral hazard problem of the bank cannot be
solved. This case is excluded by assumption (3). Q.E.D.
A.2. Proof of Proposition 2
For the bank, the design of the optimal contract depends on the parameter constellation. We must
distinguish the following cases:
· Case 1
( )( ) VRforeVRXpp ³³+--
· Case 2
( ) VRforeXpp =³-
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In Case 1, the bank exerts the first-best effort with either limited or full-recourse credit. Full
recourse is not necessary to solve the problem, because either the difference in state-contingent
payoffs of the project, X – 0, is high, or the influence of e on the probability of success is large,
i.e.,  ( p - p ),  which  provides  strong  incentives  to  the  firm’s manager.  In  Case  2,  full  recourse  is
necessary to induce the firm's manager to exert effort e. By increasing the debtor's liability, the
payoff in the case of failure is reduced, and thus, the difference in state-contingent payoffs
increases. Q.E.D.
A.3. Proof of Proposition 3
Parameter constellations as in Case A and Case 1
Case A: ( )( ) 0VforbVRpp LH >³-- (A.1)
Case 1: ( )( ) VRforeVRXpp >³+-- (A.2)
contain the cases in which we can solve both incentive problems simultaneously. Limited liability
solves the firm's problem and the positive payoff for the bank in the case of failure does not
destroy the bank's incentive.
The optimal credit contract specifies R and V according to the solution of the following
optimization:
( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )B-PC0bIVp1Rp
B-IC0bVRpp
F-IC0eVRXpps.t.
R,V,e,b
eVWp1RXWpmax
HH
LH
HH
HH
³---+
³---
³-+--
---+-+
The bank’s participation constraint is strictly binding because there is perfect competition in the
banking sector. Accordingly, the terms of the contract are given by
( )
H
H
H
p
VbIV-R
or
p
Vp1bIR
-+
=
--+
=
(A.3)
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From the incentive compatibility constraints, the difference between the state contingent payoffs
is determined by:
F)-(ICfrom
pp
e-XV-R
B)-(ICfrom
pp
bVR
HH
LH
-
£
-
³-
The condition, which has to hold to solve both problems simultaneously, is given by
b
pp
e
pp
X
LHHH -
+
-
³
11
.
If the bank’s incentive compatibility constraint is binding, but the firm’s incentive compatibility
constraint is not, then the credit contract determines
þ
ý
ü
î
í
ì
-
-=
-
-
+=
LH
L
LH
L
pp
pbIV;
pp
p1bIR .
Q.E.D.
A.4. Proof of Proposition 4
In the following cases it is always impossible to solve both incentive problems.
· Case 1 and Case B:
Due to the incentive problem of the bank it is necessary that V=0. This non-recourse structure
implies for Case 1 ( )( ) 0eRXpp ³---  where
p
IR = . However, this case is ruled out by
assumption, since in this case there would be no incentive problem of the firm.
· Case 2 and Case A or Case B:
Case 2 requires R=V. But this full-recourse structure cannot solve the bank's incentive
problem, because ( ) b0pp LH ³-  is not fulfilled.
The firm maximizes its profit by solving the moral-hazard problem that has the higher return.
(1) Return of managerial effort
To solve this problem, the contract must specify R=V. Thus, the effect of e is:
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( ) ( )( )[ ] ( ) ( )( )[ ]
( )( )
( ) eXpp
eVRXpp
VWp1RXWpeVWp1RXWp
LL
LL
LLLL
--
=-+--
=--+-+----+-+
(2) Return of bank effort
To solve this problem, the contract must specify V=0 and R, where R is such that 0b-I-Rp = .
Thus, the effect of b is
( ) ( )
( ) bXpp
Wp1
p
IXWpWp1
p
bIXWp
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L
L
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--
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Depending on which expression is higher, the firm's manager decides which incentive problem to
solve:
If ( ) ( ) bXppeXpp LHLL -->-- , then the firm's incentive problem should be solved by a
credit contract that specifies R=V. For parameters like those in Case 1, the contract might also
specify R>V.
If ( ) ( ) bXppeXpp LHLL --<-- , then the bank should be granted an incentive to exert effort by
a credit contract specifying V=0. In Case A, the bank also gets the first-best incentive when it has
limited recourse, V>0. Q.E.D.
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Fig. 1. The relation between the use of project finance and country risk. This figure plots the project finance
share against the risk of the borrower’s home country. Our sample contains 139 country-specific
observations and comprises all loans signed between January 1991 and December 2005. We measure the
project finance share as the total volume of project finance loans of all borrowers in a given country and
express it as a percentage of the total volume of all syndicated loans of all borrowers in this country. We
measure country risk as the average across all annual Euromoney’s country risk scores from 1991 to 2005.
We convert Euromoney’s original score to a scale of zero to 100, with higher values indicating more
country risk.
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Table 1
Payoffs at time 1
This table illustrates the cash flows to the project, sponsoring firm, and bank under different types of recourse in
our one-period, two-states of the world model. In state 1, the project is successful and pays a cash flow of X. In state
2, the project fails and pays zero. The loan contract specifies that the bank receives R in state 1 and V in state 2. V
indicates the amount of inside collateral and depends on the recourse structure of the loan. The project costs, which
are fully loan-financed amount to I. The sponsoring firm has cash flows unrelated to the project in the amount of W.
Cash flows to
Recourse structure State
Inside
collateral Project Sponsor Bank lender
Full recourse 1 V=R X W+X -R R-I
2 V=R 0 W-R R-I
Limited recourse 1 0<V<R X W+X -R R-I
2 0<V<R 0 W-V V-I
Non recourse 1 V=0 X W+X -R R-I
2 V=0 0 W 0-I
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Table 2
Syndicated lending by development banks
This table lists all financial institutions, which we caterorize according to World Bank's guidelines as
multilateral development banks (MDBs) or multilateral financial institutions (MFIs). The table also lists all national
development banks (NDBs) with more than $1,000 billion in funding and more than 100 syndicated loans signed
between January 1, 1991 and December 31, 2005. For each financial institution we report the total amount of
syndicated loans (SLs) that it funds, the share of project finance loans among all funded syndicate loans, and
whether or not the financial institution is included in our bank influence proxy.
Financial institution Category
Funded
amount
(in $ bn)
Share of
PFL volume
in SL
portfolio
(in %)
Inclusion
in the
bank
influence
proxy
European Bank for Reconstruction & Development MDB 31,757 87.0 yes
Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau NDB 30,799 19.1 no
Japan Bank for International Cooperation NDB 26,877 57.3 no
Korea Development Bank NDB 19,276 22.7 no
World Bank (including IBRD and IFC) MDB 11,832 49.5 yes
Export Development Canada NDB 10,572 18.7 no
European Investment Bank MFI 7,881 81.0 yes
Export-Import Bank of Korea NDB 5,276 38.7 no
Internationale Nederlanden Bank NV NDB 3,983 5.1 no
Asian Development Bank MDB 3,691 50.7 yes
Export-Import Bank of the Republic of China NDB 1,117 19.9 no
Nordic Investment Bank MFI 860 27.2 yes
Corporacion Andina de Fomento MDB (subregional) 558 20.3 yes
Inter-American Development Bank MDB 544 58.3 yes
Islamic Development Bank MFI 379 15.7 yes
African Development Bank MDB 133 100.0 yes
Central American Bank for Economic Integration MDB (subregional) 36 68.7 yes
OPEC Fund MFI 20 39.4 yes
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Table 3
Geographic distribution of syndicated loans
The table reports descriptive statistics for all syndicated loans to borrowers in 139 countries signed between January 1, 1991
and December 31, 2005 and for the average regional characteristics during this period. Based on the volume of syndicate loans
and project finance loans in $ million ($m), we calculate the project finance share as the volume of project finance loans in
percent of syndicated loan volume. We characterize the borrower’s regions in four dimensions. We measure bank influence as
the volume of syndicated loans funded by multilateral development banks and multilateral financial institutions in percent of
the total volume of syndicated loans. We measure economic health with Euromoney’s economic performance index which
includes current GDP per capita figures and on a poll of economic projections. The scale of this proxy ranges from zero to 100.
We define corporate governance as the equally weighted average of stock market capitalization and domestic credit to the
private sector, both as a percentage of GDP. We use the average of six measures of political risk - voice and accountability of
the government, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption - from
The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Research Indicators Data Set to measure political risk. The scale of this proxy
ranges from zero to 100. A higher value indicates better economic health, better corporate governance, or more political risk.
Syndicate loan market characteristics Average characteristic of the borrower's region
Borrower region
Syndicated
loan
volume
(in $m)
Project
finance
loan
volume
(in $m)
Project
finance
share
Bank
influence
Economic
health
Corporate
governance
Political
risk
Middle East & Turkey 312,178 114,392 36.6% 0.2 52 38 49
Eastern Europe & CIS 312,241 66,838 21.4% 11.3 68 13 53
Asia & Pacific 2,658,199 365,025 13.7% 0.4 52 54 49
Latin America & Caribbean 410,439 50,209 12.2% 1.4 58 30 48
Africa 92,042 7,244 7.9% 0.7 73 17 57
Western Europe 6,024,295 179,485 3.0% 0.1 23 83 31
North America 14,968,944 157,467 1.1% 0.0 17 119 30
Global 24,778,338 940,660 3.8% 0.2 55 39 48
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Table 4
Changes in the use of project finance at different levels of country risk
This table illustrates how the use of project finance changes for borrowers in
countries with different levels of country risk. We sort our 139 country-specific
observations into four quartiles of countries with low, moderately low, moderately
high, and high country risk. For each quartile we report the average country risk and
average project finance volume. We measure the project finance share as the total
volume of project finance loans of all borrowers in a given country as a percentage of
the total volume of all syndicated loans of all borrowers in this country. We measure
country risk as the average across all annual Euromoney’s country risk scores from
1991 to 2005. We convert Euromoney’s original score to a scale of zero to 100, with
higher values indicating more country risk. The z-test indicates whether or not the
average project finance share differs between the current and next higher quartile. *,
**, and *** are based on one-sided probabilities and indicate that the current mean is
significantly smaller than the mean of the next higher quartile at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01
level, respectively.
Level of country
risk
Average
country risk
Average project
finance share z-test
Number of
observations
Low 11.9 7.1% -4.68*** 34
Moderately low 43.1 22.5% -1.59* 35
Moderately high 60.6 32.2% 0.94 35
High 73.1 24.8% 35
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Table 5
Determinants of the use of project finance
This table shows regression results for our main proxies based on a sample of 139 country-specific
observations. We define the dependent variable, project finance share, in two different ways. First, as the total
volume of  project  finance  loans  of  all  borrowers  in  a  given country  and express  it  as  a  percentage  of  the  total
volume of all syndicated loans of all borrowers in this country. Second, as the total number of project finance
loans of all borrowers in a given country and express it as a percentage of the total number of all syndicated loans
of  all  borrowers  in  this  country.  We  measure  bank  influence  as  the  volume  of  syndicated  loans  funded  by
multilateral development banks and multilateral financial institutions in percent of the total volume of syndicated
loans. We measure economic health with Euromoney’s economic performance index which includes current GDP
per  capita  figures  and on a  poll  of  economic  projections.  The  scale  of  this  proxy ranges  from zero  to  100.  We
define corporate governance as the equally weighted average of stock market capitalization and domestic credit to
the private sector, both as a percentage of GDP. We use the average of six measures of political risk - voice and
accountability of the government, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and
control of corruption - from The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Research Indicators Data Set to measure
political risk. The scale of this proxy ranges from zero to 100. A higher value indicates better economic health,
better corporate governance, or more political risk. In each panel we use a different aggregation method for the
independent variables political risk, corporate governance, and economic health. In addition to the simple average,
we aggregate annual values by (A) calculating a simple, equally weighted averages over time, (B) calculating a
weighted average with weights based on the relative syndicated loan volume, (C) using the first or (D) last
available annual value, (E) by using the initial value in combination with the change over time. We calculate this
change as absolute difference between the values in the initial and last year. The calculation of the bank influence
proxy does not change and we report the results for comparison reasons only. We estimate single regressions as
OLS, but use factor analysis in multiple regressions to remove the correlation between the independent variables.
The table reports t-statistics within parentheses.
Dependent variable: Project finance share based
on loan volume
Dependent variable: Project finance share
based on loan numbers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)   (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A: Simple average
Bank influence 0.48 7.39 0.47 7.26
(3.66) (3.50) (4.25) (4.06)
Political risk 0.68 5.77 0.61 4.90
(3.57) (2.73) (3.74) (2.74)
Economic health -0.32 -5.17 -0.30 -0.53
(-3.16) (-0.01) (-3.47) (-0.30)
-0.19 -4.64 -0.17 -4.64Corporate
governance (-3.47)  (-2.45) (-3.71) (-2.60)
Constant 18.46  -10.72  35.98  29.05  21.76 15.92 -10.02 32.50 25.83 19.17
(7.86) (-1.15)  (7.18) (9.59)  (10.34) (8.00) (-1.25) (7.60) (9.98) (10.76)
Adjusted R2 0.082 0.078 0.061 0.074 0.136  0.110 0.086 0.070 0.080 0.163
Panel B: Weighted average
Bank influence 0.48 9.83 0.47 9.59
(3.66) (4.63) (4.25) (5.40)
Political risk 0.68 4.83 0.61 4.04
(3.44) (2.28) (3.60) (2.28)
Economic health -0.35 -1.66 -0.32 -2.00
(-3.37) (-0.78) (-3.68) (-1.13)
-0.18 -5.34 -0.16 -4.67Corporate
governance (-3.53)  (-2.52) (-3.72) (-2.63)
Constant 18.46  -9.92  36.85  29.17  22.91 15.92  -9.25  33.24  25.87  20.18
(7.86) (-1.01)  (7.40) (9.64)  (10.83) (8.00) (-1.10) (7.81) (9.99) (11.42)
Adjusted R2 0.080 0.076 0.070 0.080 0.184   0.110 0.084 0.080 0.090 0.228
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Table 5 continued
Dependent variable: Project finance share based
on loan volume
Dependent variable: Project finance share
based on loan numbers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)   (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel C: First value
Bank influence 0.48 7.53 0.47 7.37
(3.66) (3.57) (4.25) (4.11)
Political risk 0.67 5.52 0.59 4.40
(3.48) (2.61) (3.55) (2.46)
Economic health -0.22 -0.72 0.21 -1.23
(-2.68) (-0.34) (-3.03) (-0.68)
-0.25 -5.10 -0.23  -4.62Corporate
governance (-3.35)  (-2.41) (-3.57) (-2.58)
Constant 18.46  -10.43  32.60  28.87  21.76 15.92  -9.05  29.63  25.65  19.17
(7.86) (-1.10)  (7.08) (9.48)  (10.33) (8.00) (-1.11) (7.53) (9.84) (10.74)
Adjusted R2 0.080 0.075 0.040 0.070 0.135  0.110 0.078 0.060 0.080 0.159
Panel D: Last value
Bank influence 0.48 7.07 0.47 7.04
(3.66) (3.34) (4.25) (3.93)
Political risk 0.65 5.95 0.59 5.20
(3.59) (2.81) (3.80) (2.90)
Economic health -0.28 -0.88 -0.26 -1.13
(-2.90) (-0.42) (-3.16) (-0.63)
-0.16 -4.99 -0.14  -4.40Corporate
governance (-3.44)  (-2.35) (-3.66) (-2.46)
Constant 18.46  -10.15  32.00  28.95  21.76 15.92  -9.73 28.73 25.71  19.17
(7.86) (-1.11)  (7.68) (9.59)  (10.31) (8.00) (-1.24) (8.06) (9.95) (10.75)
Adjusted R2 0.080 0.079 0.050 0.070 0.131  0.110 0.060 0.06 0.080 0.160
Panel E: Mixed values
-0.29 0.59Initial political
risk
(-2.93) (3.57)
-0.20 0.63Change in
political risk (-1.23) (1.29)
0.67 -0.27Initial economic
health (3.48) (-3.21)
0.51 -0.17Change in
economic health (0.89) (-1.22)
-0.21 -0.19Initial corporate
governance (-2.50) (-2.68)
-0.10 -0.09Change in
corporate
governance
(-1.07) (-1.11)
Constant 33.26 -10.83 29.42 -9.54 30.19 26.14
(7.19) (1.14) (9.53) (-1.17) (7.63) (9.90)
Adjusted R2 0.047 0.073 0.070 0.082 0.059 0.080
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Table 6
Robustness checks regarding the effects of the Asian and Russian crises
We aggregate the data into three separate periods: a pre-crises period from 1991 to 1997, a crises
period from 1998 to 1999, and a post-crises period from 2000 to 2005. For each period, we define the
dependent  variable  as  the  total  volume  of  project  finance  loans  of  all  borrowers  in  a  given  country  and
express it as a percentage of the total volume of all syndicated loans of all borrowers in this country. We
measure bank influence as the volume of syndicated loans funded by multilateral development banks and
multilateral financial institutions in percent of the total volume of syndicated loans. We measure economic
health with Euromoney’s economic performance index which includes current GDP per capita figures and
on a poll of economic projections. The scale of this proxy ranges from zero to 100. We define corporate
governance as the equally weighted average of stock market capitalization and domestic credit to the
private sector, both as a percentage of GDP. We use the average of six measures of political risk - voice
and accountability of the government, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule
of law, and control of corruption - from The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Research Indicators
Data Set to measure political risk. The scale of this proxy ranges from zero to 100. A higher value indicates
better economic health, better corporate governance, or more political risk. For all independent variables,
we calculate simple averages across each subperiod. We estimate regressions as OLS. The table reports t-
statistics within parentheses. The F-test indicates whether or not the slope coefficients differ across periods.
*, **, and *** indicate significant differences at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively.
Dependent variable: Project finance share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bank influence * pre-crises dummy 1.14
(2.22)
Bank influence * crises dummy 1.29
(2.56)
Bank influence * post-crises dummy 0.58
(5.15)
Political risk * pre-crises dummy 0.39
(2.90)
Political risk * crises dummy 0.41
(3.11)
Political risk * post-crises dummy 0.55
(4.37)
Economic health * pre-crises dummy -0.24
(-3.62)
Economic health * crises dummy -0.19
(-2.55)
Economic health * post-crises dummy -0.22
(-2.50)
Corporate governance * pre-crises dummy -0.16
(-2.92)
Corporate governance * crises dummy -0.09
(-2.04)
Corporate governance * post-crises dummy -0.11
(-2.71)
Constant 15.42 -3.01 28.77 23.52
(10.55) (-0.51) (8.37) (11.60)
F-test
   Pre-crises versus crises 0.042 0.092 0.467 1.092
   Pre-crises versus post-crises 1.182 5.038** 0.108 0.663
   Crises versus post-crises 1.946 3.786*** 0.083 0.099
Number of observations 340 334 340 340
Adjusted R2 0.088 0.053 0.030 0.030
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Table 7
Panel data robustness checks regarding the determinants of the use of project finance
This table shows regression results for our main proxies based on a panel of 585
observations taken for 65 countries and nine years. We define the dependent variable as
the total volume of project finance loans of all borrowers in a given country and year and
express it as a percentage of the total volume of all syndicated loans of all borrowers in
this country and year. Second, as the total number of project finance loans of all
borrowers  in  a  given  country  and  express  it  as  a  percentage  of  the  total  number  of  all
syndicated  loans  of  all  borrowers  in  this  country.  We  measure  bank  influence  as  the
volume of syndicated loans funded by multilateral development banks and multilateral
financial institutions in percent of the total volume of syndicated loans. We measure
economic health with Euromoney’s economic performance index which includes current
GDP per  capita  figures  and on a  poll  of  economic  projections.  The  scale  of  this  proxy
ranges from zero to 100. We define corporate governance as the equally weighted
average of stock market capitalization and domestic credit to the private sector, both as a
percentage  of  GDP.  We  use  the  average  of  six  measures  of  political  risk  -  voice  and
accountability of the government, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory
quality, rule of law, and control of corruption - from The World Bank’s Worldwide
Governance Research Indicators Data Set to measure political risk. The scale of this
proxy ranges from zero to 100. A higher value indicates better economic health, better
corporate governance, or more political risk. In Panel A, we estimate a fixed effects
model which contains year-specific intercepts. We estimate regressions as OLS. In panel
B, we estimate single regressions as OLS, but use factor analysis in multiple regressions
to remove the correlation between the independent variables. The table reports t-statistics
within parentheses.
Dependent variable: Project finance share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Fixed effects model
Bank influence 0.50 6.04
(2.09) (5.95)
Political  risk 0.63 1.95
(7.41) (1.64)
Economic health -0.26 -0.49
(-6.67) (-0.46)
Corporate governance -0.09 -3.36
(-6.56) (-5.07)
1996-dummy 9.44 -16.38 28.48 14.95 6.74
(4.56) (-4.24) (7.52) (6.28) (2.76)
1997-dummy 12.41 -13.50 30.98 18.11 10.14
(5.79) (-3.60) (8.59) (7.70) (4.73)
1998-dummy 15.22 -9.54 33.95 22.07 14.26
(5.89) (-2.41) (8.64) (7.91) (5.40)
1999-dummy 17.80 -7.38 31.37 24.55 20.37
(5.55) (-1.88) (7.83) (7.16) (6.50)
2000-dummy 12.07 -13.36 25.70 19.55 14.68
(5.27) (-3.60) (7.67) (6.99) (5.99)
2001-dummy 15.63 -9.50 29.19 23.20 18.54
(5.13) (-2.30) (7.51) (6.95) (6.20)
2002-dummy 13.12 -11.34 28.08 20.87 15.54
(4.68) (-2.93) (7.68) (6.89) (5.71)
2003-dummy 11.20 -13.49 25.74 18.77 13.61
(3.82) (-3.23) (7.10) (6.31) (4.87)
2004-dummy 16.42 -9.52 31.13 23.51 17.45
(4.94) (-2.30) (7.25) (6.60) (5.56)
Adjusted R2 0.014 0.084 0.053 0.045 0.092
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Table 7 continued
Dependent variable: Project finance share
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel B: Random effects model
Bank influence 0.50 5.16
(3.06) (5.89)
Political  risk 0.62 2.08
(7.32) (2.37)
Economic health -0.24 -2.58
(-5.81) (-2.95)
Corporate governance -0.09 -2.71
(-5.13) (-3.10)
Constant 13.70 -11.48 28.13 20.38 14.59
(14.27) (-3.13) (11.27) (14.45) (16.67)
Adjusted R2 0.014 0.082 0.053 0.041 0.084
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Table 8
An in-depth analysis of the role of bank moral hazard
This table shows regression results for our sample of 139 country-specific observations. We define the
dependent variable as the total volume of project finance loans of all  borrowers in a given country and
express it as a percentage of the total volume of all syndicated loans of all borrowers in this country. In
Panel A, we measure bank influence as the volume of syndicated loans funded by development banks in
percent of the total volume of syndicated loans. We distinguish between three different categories of
development banks: multilateral development banks (MDBs), multilateral financial institutions (MFIs),
and national development banks (NDBs). In regressions (1) and (3) we aggregate all three categories
whereas we investigate them separately in regression (2). In regression (3) we also employ bank-specific
dummy variables in combination with our market share proxy. These dummies are coded as one if the
respective development bank is part of the syndicate and zero otherwise. This allows us to investigate
whether the addition of a particular development bank increases the influence of the group as a whole.
Only those development banks are considered that lend to at least 30 of our 139 countries. These are the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), World Bank (WB), Kreditanstalt für
Wiederaufbau (KfW), Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), and Export Development
Canada (ExCan). In Panel B, we measure political risk using the six individual measures provided by
The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Research Indicators Data Set. Political risk as used in
regressions (10) and (11) is defined as the simple average of these six individual measures. To avoid
multicollinearity problems we do not use this proxy directly but regress it on our proxies for rule of law
and regulatory quality, respectively. We use the regression residuals as the residual political risk proxy in
regressions (10) and (11), respectively. We estimate all regressions as OLS. The table reports t-statistics
within parentheses.
Dependent variable:
Project finance share
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Bank influence
Aggregate market share of all MDBs, MFIs, and NDBs 0.56
(5.11)
Aggregate market share of all MDBs 0.48
(3.79)
Aggregate market share of all MFIs 0.92
(1.03)
Aggregate market share of all NDBs 0.78
(3.60)
Aggregate market share of all MDBs, MFIs, and NDBs 0.32
(1.35)
Aggregate market share of all MDBs, MFIs, and NDBs * EBRD dummy -0.08
(-0.35)
Aggregate market share of all MDBs, MFIs, and NDBs * WB dummy 0.36
(1.68)
Aggregate market share of all MDBs, MFIs, and NDBs * KfW dummy 0.41
(0.85)
Aggregate market share of all MDBs, MFIs, and NDBs * JBIC dummy 0.29
(1.25)
Aggregate market share of all MDBs, MFIs, and NDBs * ExCan dummy 0.10
(0.27)
Constant 16.28 16.05 15.07
(6.95) (6.81) (6.10)
Adjusted R2 0.154 0.151 0.174
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Table 8 continued
Dependent variable: Project finance share
(4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)  (11)
Panel B: Political risk
Control of corruption 0.66
(4.06)
Government effectiveness 0.58
(3.40)
Political stability 0.58
(2.96)
Voice and accountability 0.69
(3.75)
Regulatory quality 0.48 0.48
(2.46) (2.56)
Rule of law 0.57  0.57
(3.30) (3.32)
Residual political risk 1.44  1.88
(1.55) (3.52)
Constant -9.85  -5.93  -6.37  -12.04  -0.90  -5.39  -5.39  -0.90
(-1.22) (-0.70) (-0.65) (-1.30) (-0.10) (-0.63) (-0.64) (-0.10)
Adjusted R2 0.101 0.071 0.053 0.087 0.035 0.067 0.080 0.110
